Research suggests that close relationships with animals encourage psychological explanations of their behavior. We report three experiments in which we manipulated
INTRODUCTION
Those of us who own pets sometimes explain their behavior in the language of human psychology. Recently, a dog trainer posted on the web, "People think their dogs are spiteful sometimes. . . People think their dogs have separation issues and need play dates" (Katz 2005 ; also Klein 2005) . The phenomenon is not uncommon. People in all cultures have a predilection for psychological description of animal behavior. Scientists since Francis Bacon, five centuries ago (Guthrie 1993 p. 62 ; see also Povinelli and Preuss 1995, Mitchell 1997 ) have decried this behavior as an undesirable form of anthropomorphism or folk psychology. More recently, scholars have argued that anthropomorphism is an overly general label for justified as well as unjustified attributions and assumptions about nonhumans (Fisher, 1991; Bavidge and Ground 1994) . Further, what is considered anthropomorphic varies across cultures and time, and the orientation and language of scientific fields (Crist 1999) . Researchers thus have become more interested in the bases of psychological description.
The purpose of the present article is to show how people's social relationship with an animal or object influences their likelihood of giving psychological explanations of its behavior. By psychological explanations we mean descriptions of the causes of behavior in terms of social motives and goals, secondary emotions (e.g., admiration), and reasons, e.g., "He did X because he wanted to get even." This is an important question because our use of psychological explanation has implications for many other attitudes: how we differentiate humans from other beings, how we think about animal welfare, and our interactions with animals (e.g., Fidler, Light, and Costall 1996; Rajecki et al. 1999; Serpell 2002) , artifacts (e.g., Parise et al. 1999 ) and other people (e.g, Leyens et al 2000) .
For instance, Leyens et al. 2000 showed that people attribute more complex secondary emotions to members of their own ingroup, and they argue that denying secondary emotion to others indicates a rejection of their humanity.
Cognitive-Perceptual Bases of Psychological Explanations
The literature in cognitive science (and more recently neuroscience [Blakemore et al, 2003) suggests that psychological descriptions of behavior arise as cognitive constructions of involuntary, automatic perceptions. People universally perceive causality and animism in animals and objects that move and change their trajectories nonlinearly, especially when they seem to interact with their environment as by avoiding obstacles or seeking goals (for reviews, see Blythe, Miller, and Todd 1999; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000) .
One of the earliest investigations bearing on psychological explanations of behavior was a study by Heider and Simmel (1944) in which they created a film showing three animated objects apparently interacting (download available at http://anthropomorphism.org/psychology2.html). Heider and Simmel reported that participants perceived a meaningful structure in the movement of the objects. Participants meaningfulness, and associated social narratives. Thus, the interpretation of such visual events as causal or non-causal depends initially on precise psychophysical events that combine time-and/or space-contiguity between events with relative velocities (Schlottman & Shanks, 1992; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999) .
It is not entirely clear why people create social narratives to explain events they perceive to be causally related or living (or lifelike) but this tendency seems closely related to changes in the inferential principles they are using, for example, attending to motive. If so, animations that look causally related and lifelike as those in the HeiderSimmel film might activate mental linkages to related situations in a process called "structure mapping" (Gentner and Markman 1997) . For example, when the big triangle seems to cause the circle and small triangle to move away at a rapid pace, this event activates thoughts of situations in which people escape threat. These cognitive constructions help people impose structure and order on their observations, especially when the target's true nature is unknown (as is the case with animated objects and with animals). Similar processes occur when we judge people's interactions with one another (Gilovich, T. 1991; Srull and Wyer 1979) .
Social Factors in Psychological Explanation
The perceptual and cognitive processes described above do not explain several anomalies in people's accounts of animals. People explain their pet animals psychologically more than other animals (Herzog and Galvin 1997) . They make excuses for their own pet's poor behavior more than others' pets (Rajecki et al. 1999 ). Owners accord their pets advanced human capabilities and emotions but not necessarily other people's pets (Sanders 1993; Shapiro 1990; Fidler, Light, and Costall, 1996). Caporael and Heyes (1997) In the studies below, we defined psychological explanation of behavior as the attribution of behavior as intentional, as having reasons, and as involving complex emotions (e.g, guilt) or thoughts (e.g., retribution). Following from the arguments above, we hypothesized that an ownership relationship with a nonhuman would increase psychological explanations. In the experiments, we manipulated the ownership relationship with the nonhuman so as to isolate its causal impact. Fidler et al. (1996) reported that students who had owned pets were more likely to use psychological explanations of a dog's behavior than those who had not. Pet owners and their families, however, may differ in many ways from nonowners, preventing us from inferring causality from the observed ownership-explanation link. We carried out a conceptual replication of Fidler et al. by manipulating the participant's relationship with a rated target and the species of the rated target.
EXPERIMENT 1

Method
The design of this study was a 2 factor (Distant Relationship versus Close Relationship) x 2 (Person vs. Dog) within-subjects factorial experiment.
Sample. Participants were 22 female and 4 male adults, average age 45, who were volunteers and staff at a no-kill animal shelter. They completed the study in exchange for a $5.00 per person contribution to the shelter. Nine did not themselves own a dog (7 of this group owned cats).
Procedure. All participants were given a booklet and, on each page, were asked to rate the intentionality and to write a brief explanation of one of six hypothetical behaviors. The six behaviors were: "met you at the doorstep when you entered your home;" "left a mess in your kitchen;" "when a fire alarm sounded at night, led you outside;" "yelped when the pot boiled over in your kitchen;" "woke you up in the early morning," and "sat next to you when you were feeling sad." These six behaviors were attributed separately to two target dogs and two target persons. One dog was said to be "your dog," and the other dog was said to be "a neighbor's dog." One target person was said to be "your friend," and the other was said to be "a visitor." Participants made the 24 judgments sequentially, in random order. We predicted that participants would rate both persons' behavior as highly intentional, and that they would explain their behavior as having reasons. We also predicted that participants would rate the dog said to be "your dog" as more intentional than a neighbor's dog (Target X Relationship statistical interaction).
Measures.
Following the theoretical work of Malle (1999) Coding. We adapted the F.EX (version 4) procedure developed by Malle (2000) for coding folk explanations of behavior as cause explanations, causal history for reasons, or reason explanations. For instance, a dog or person leading one out of a burning house could be explained as a fear response (cause), as a consequence of his love for you (causal history for reasons), or as his wanting to lead you away from danger (reason). We considered causal history for reasons and reason explanations to be more psychological than causes are. When participants gave two explanations, we coded only the first. The reliability of two raters blind to condition was r = .70, reduced in part because some explanations were too brief to be coded, e.g., "alarm." Accordingly, we dropped oneword explanations and used a third trained coder who adjudicated when the two coders differed in their ratings.
Results
Intentionality Ratings. The analysis of intentionality used multi-level regression due to the within-participants design. The independent variables were target species (dog versus person) and relationship (close [your dog/your friend] versus distant [neighbor's dog/a visitor], and the interaction of these two factors). We controlled for subject (random variable) and whether or not the participant was a dog owner (fixed variable).
We also examined the impact of the valence of the hypothetical behaviors. We report the effect size, Cohen's d, of statistically significant regression effects. The effect size measures the magnitude of an effect independent of sample size; roughly, an effect size of .8 or greater is considered "large," .5 is "medium," and .2 is "small."
In a model with the manipulated variables (target species and relationship, and their interaction), the valence of the hypothetical behavior (positive versus negative), and the actual dog ownership status of the participant (a dog owner or not), we found, first, that more positive behaviors were rated as more intentional whether they were done by a We conducted experiments 2 and 3 as conceptual replications to help overcome these limitations. In both studies, we also measured participants' affection or liking for the target as way to understand emotional aspects of psychological explanation.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this study, we examined how people's relationship with the small triangle in the Heider-Simmel film (described above) would influence their psychological explanations of the moving shapes. We hypothesized that those who were told the small triangle was theirs would use more psychological explanations of the behavior of the objects in the film.
Method
The design was a one-factor (Experimental versus Control) between-subjects experiment. In the experimental condition, we told randomly assigned participants that the small triangle in the Heider-Simmel film was theirs. We compared their explanations of the objects' behavior in the film with those of a control group that saw the film without any intervention.
Participants. Twenty-one male and 15 female Carnegie Mellon University undergraduate and graduate students, average age 23, participated in the study. Half of the participants were assigned randomly to the Experimental condition and half to the Control condition.
Procedure. We digitized Heider and Simmel's (1944) animated film into a 72-second Flash video (anthropomorphism.org/psychology2.html) that we played on a computer display along with all the instructions and forms for the study. All participants read that they would watch a short video twice and answer questions about it. They were instructions: "Before we start, we will have a drawing to determine which object in the movie is yours." The experimenter showed the participant a pile of envelopes and asked the participant to pick one. Inside all envelopes there was a small black triangle, with a white label, "the little triangle." The experimenter told these participants "Okay, this little triangle is yours" and put it next to the computer, within the visual field of the participant.
At the start of the video these participants were asked, "Which object is yours? Please Coding. We applied Malle's (2000) method for coding explanations of behavior, as in Experiment 1. We also used the coding method of Berry, Misovich, Kean and Baron (1992) , who studied people's "anthropomorphism" (human psychological language and explanations) of the Heider-Simmel film. For the latter procedure, we first unitized the free descriptions into meaningful phrases. Then two raters blind to condition coded the subject of the phrase and the types of psychological responses describing the subject:
action referents such as "hitting," state referents such as "frustrated," trait referents such as "dominant," social roles such as "allies," age referents such as "adult," and gender referents such as "she." We counted each of these, for each phrase, and for each object.
Coders agreed 85.5%. Disagreements were resolved by a third coder. Following Berry et al., we also coded the themes in the descriptions: aggression (e.g. "aggressive"), escape (e.g. "ran away"), cooperation (e.g. "helpful"), failure (e.g. "failed to"), and effort (e.g.
"tried to enter"). Agreement rate of the two coders was 93.9%. A third coder resolved all disagreements. Generally, using Berry et al.'s codes, women used more psychological explanations than men did, and non-US citizen Asian students less so, so we used these as control variables in analyses.
Results
All but one participant (in the control group) employed social narratives of the objects in the video, typically writing a coherent story in which they characterized the circle as a compatriot (friend, lover, companion) of the little triangle, and the big triangle of the small triangle equally highly, and increasingly so over the four scenes we had them judge (from a mean of 7.7 out of 10 scale points in the first scene shown, to 9 out of 10 points, in the last scene). There was little variability, with almost all participants saying the behavior of the little triangle was very or extremely intentional.
Explanations. As noted above, participants' gave coherent social narratives of the objects' movements (e.g., "I witnessed a fight between a group of objects.").
Explanations of causality using the Malle coding scheme were more likely to be reasons for the behavior (mean = 2. The participants in this study merely viewed a film of objects moving. Our results indicate that even in this comparatively sterile situation, participants' relationship with one of the objects influenced the way people interpret the film. When the little triangle was "theirs," they tended to see the situation as more social, to feel closer to the little triangle and the circle and more negatively about the big triangle. They also gave more psychological explanations of all the objects' behavior when the little triangle was "theirs." This study provides some support for our argument that a close relationship through ownership can lead to more psychological explanations of behavior.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 1 examined a hypothetical relationship with a dog, and experiment 2 examined a relationship with an animated object. To increase the validity of and generality of our results, in this study we experimentally manipulated participants' ownership of a pet fish. We also examined the separate effects of ownership of the pet fish and the amount of required interaction and observation of the fish. In the world, ownership of a pet is highly correlated, not just with an owner's felt relationship with their pet, but also with the degree to which the owner observes the animal's behavior and responds at close range (daily in the case of most pet owners versus occasionally in the case of most nonowners). The effects of ownership on psychological explanation might derive from this more frequent observation rather than from ownership per se. To examine the impact of ownership separately from the amount of observation, we manipulated these two variables orthogonally. We did not manipulate affection directly but we measured owners and nonowners' affection for the fish in order to evaluate the possible mediating effects of affection on psychological explanations of behavior.
Method
The design of this study was a two-factor 2 (Fish Owner versus Fish Caretaker) x 2 (Daily versus Weekly Report) between-subjects factorial experiment.
Participants. Eighty-two staff and students at Carnegie Mellon University were recruited for a study in which participants would care for a Betta fish. Participants were told the study would last for two weeks, and that they would be paid $20.00 for completing the study.
Procedure. The investigators submitted the experimental protocol to the university's regulatory panel for protection of vertebrate animal subjects, and it was approved. Among the steps taken to protect the fish in the study: (a) the vendor was chosen carefully for its specific plan and guarantee of low stress transport and protection of the fish; (b) a fish care center was set up in one of the author's offices to provide appropriate air and water temperature, water preparation, and food for the fish; (c) the authors purchased 1-gallon containers to house each fish; (d) the authors constructed specific routine procedures and forms for educating participants and monitoring and ensuring the health of the fish while participants were caring for them; (e) after the experiment was completed, the senior author cared for pet fish while participants were away on holiday and arranged adoptions of remaining fish.
When participants came to the experimental room for the study, they were given a choice of one of three fish to take home. All fish were male Betta in a range of colors.
Participants were given a large fish bowl, conditioned water and conditioner, sufficient food for two weeks, a disposable camera, and detailed oral and written instructions on the care of the fish.
In the Owner condition, participants were told, "We are studying caretaking. . .we will let you choose a fish for you to own. You will take your fish home and report its activity to us. . . Then, after two weeks, you will bring your fish back for a check-up so that we can verify your fish is alive and well. We will also ask you to fill out a questionnaire . . ."
In the Caretaker condition, participants were given the same instructions except they were told the experimenter did not have enough fish for adoption yet. Participants were told, ". . . we will let you choose a fish to care for now. You will take our fish home and report its activity to us . . . Then, after two weeks, you will bring our fish back. . . By that time, we will have another fish for you to adopt."
Cross-cutting the manipulation of ownership, we manipulated the participant's required amount of interaction and observation of the fish. In the Daily Report condition, the participants were asked to take a picture of their fish every day and send in an email report on the fish's behavior. In the Weekly Report condition, the instructions and email were the same, except that the observation and report was to be done only once during the two week period weekly.
Once the participants had signed their agreement to the requirements of the study, they made an appointment to return with the fish two weeks later. When the participants returned, they completed a post-test questionnaire. They were given a chance to leave the fish for someone else to adopt or to adopt it permanently.
Measures. The final questionnaire contained a battery of items to measure commitment and affection for the fish. To measure the participants' attachment to the fish, participants were asked if they wanted to keep the fish, and if they would sell the fish. They also were asked if they had spent any money on the fish. Participants were asked whether they had named the fish. They were asked to categorize their fish as a "decoration," "personal possession," "piece of furniture," or "guest," "friend,"
"companion," "child," "stranger" or "pet." Participants rated their liking for the fish on a 7-point scale.
Participants also were asked questions to assess their psychological explanations of their fish's behavior. They were asked to list three characteristics of the fish and to
give an example to illustrate each characteristic. On 7-point scales, they were asked if the fish liked them, how smart the fish was, and if it had a similar disposition to their own.
We presented all participants with four scenarios in which they were to "imagine that [your/our] fish" exhibited the following behaviors: ". . .jumped out of its bowl," ". .
.turned toward a visitor when the visitor approached," ". . .ate less when another person fed it," and ". . .swims around more when you sit nearby." (These behaviors were chosen from observations of the fish by experimenters before the study.) We asked participants to explain these behaviors, as in Experiments 1 and 2, and to rate them on scales of instinct versus intentionality.
Coding. In this study we used three coding methods. First, two coders who were blind to condition independently coded whether the characteristics and examples given were anthropomorphic or not based on the definitions of Berry et al. (1992) and used in Experiment 2. Agreement between the two coders was 83.5% for the characteristics and 81.6% for the examples. The two coders discussed and resolved their disagreements.
Second, two coders, also blind to condition, coded the explanations of the hypothetical scenarios according to the Folk Explanation Scheme developed by Malle (2000) and used in Experiments 1 and 2. The averaged agreement rate across the 4 scenarios was 66%. A third coder resolved disagreements. In addition, the two coders who coded the explanations also coded whether the explanation was anthropomorphic in Berry et al.'s definition as they used to code the characteristics and examples. Average agreement rate across the 4 scenarios was 79.56%. Again, a third coder resolved all the disagreement.
Third
, for each open-ended response, including the reports sent by email from participants during the two-week period, word counts were analyzed with the TAWC computer program (Kramer, Fussell, & Setlock, 2003) . We counted the number of negative and positive emotional words, using Pennebaker et al.'s LIWC dictionary (2001) and gender related words (he, she, his, hers, her & him). The authors also created a new dictionary to measure the social psychological language of participants -their use of words such as "greet," "explore," and "sneaky." This category was developed in a manner specified in Pennebaker et al. (2001) . Researchers examine the texts given. A list of words a researcher considers social psychological is then passed to a second researcher, who approves or disapproves of these words and adds his own words to the dictionary. A third researcher then does the same, and then the first two researchers evaluate the entire list. Any word with 2/3rds agreement was kept as part of the final dictionary. In total, 34 words comprised this dictionary of social psychological words.
Results
Participants varied in how diligently they cared for their fish, although only one participant treated his fish poorly; he left his fish in a dormitory bathroom, from which it was immediately rescued. By contrast, most participants developed a considerate relationship with their fish. One participant described taking her fish outside to "enjoy the sun." Still another took her fish home for a holiday weekend, secreting the fish in her backpack after airport security personnel refused to let her carry the fish through the scanner. Twenty-two percent purchased additional supplies or bowl decorations during the two-weeks of the experiment. Sixty-nine percent said they would not sell the fish if asked to do so. At the end of the two-week study, all participants were asked to reaffirm their intention to own a fish; 84% of the participants adopted their fish permanently.
The analyses of the questionnaire data were performed using analysis of variance statistics, with the independent variables Ownership, Report Frequency, and the interaction of these variables. Some dependent variables were greatly skewed, and a log transformation was used in those cases (noted below and their propensity to keep the fish after the study (95% versus 75%; χ 2 = 4.5, p = .03).
Explanations. Generally, the Owner condition as compared with the Caretaker condition did not directly increase participants' social descriptions and psychological explanations. For instance, participants in the Owner condition were just marginally more likely to liken their fish to a friend, family member, or pet than those in the Caretaker condition, who tended to liken their fish to a decorative object (χ 2 = 4.4, p = .11). By contrast, participants' affection for and intention to keep the fish significantly influenced their psychological explanations. Thus, for instance, those who rated their liking for the fish 6 or 7 on the 7-point scale (that is, above the median), were significantly more likely to say the fish was a friend, family member, or pet rather than a decorative object (χ 2 = 6.6, p = .03).
Affection as an Independent Variable. In all subsequent analyses, affection for the fish is the independent variable of interest, operationalized as participants' scores on the 7-point liking scale. Because the data were highly skewed positively (median = 6), we used a log transformation of these scores in the analyses. The models also include the In final analyses, we examined the effects of knowledge of fish and knowledge of people on psychological explanation. Knowledge of fish was reported to be generally low, and did not affect other results. The effect of self-reported knowledge of people was in the same direction as in Experiment 1, that is, higher knowledge led to more psychological explanation, but across our many measures was not consistently significant statistically.
Discussion of Experiment 3
This experiment, in which participants described a pet fish, was a conceptual replication of Experiment 1, in which participants described the behavior of a target dog and person, and Experiment 2, in which participants described the behavior of moving shapes on a computer display. The findings of the first two studies suggested that an imagined ownership relationship with a dog or object increases psychological explanation of its behavior. In the second study, we also measured affection for the objects. We found that positive feelings for the target object and its partnered object, and especially negative feelings for the "aggressive" object, were associated with the ownership manipulation and with psychological explanations of the objects' behavior. In this, third experiment, ownership was associated with affection for the pet fish as well. Further, affection rather than ownership per se or amount of required observation of the fish accounted for significant variation in psychological explanations of the fish's behavior and in the use of language associated with psychological explanations. Thus the experiment suggests that emotional attachment rather than the economic relationship of ownership or the amount of observation explains why owned objects and animals are more likely to prompt psychological explanations than objects or animals that are not owned.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We aimed to discover how the nature of people's relationship with a nonhuman might affect psychological explanations of its behavior. Our studies indicate that there is a social emotional aspect of psychological explanation that has not been addressed in cognitive science studies of how people explain object or animal behavior. Previous research in cognitive and brain science has shown that perceptions of lifelikeness and causality arise from automatic perceptual processing and mapping nonhuman behavior to apparently similar human social behavior. These basic processes do not explain why people use psychological description and explanation of some animals more than others, for example, zoo animals with names versus those without, pets versus farm animals, and our own dog versus another's dog.
Our first two experiments indicated that an ownership relationship with a nonhuman encourages psychological explanation. These results accord with studies
showing that people who own possessions value them more highly than the possessions of others (Beggan 1992; Nesselroade, Beggan, and Allison 1999) . Ownership also implies many other changes in a relationship-changes in knowledge, communication, attention, and feelings. Each of these changes can affect psychological explanation. For example, people pay comparatively more attention to the unobservable behavior of intimates versus strangers (Malle and Pearce 2001) . Our third experiment showed that ownership as compared with a caretaking relationship led participants not only to value their fish more highly, but to name the fish, to be committed (in our study, measured as adopting the fish permanently), and to feel affection for the fish. These factors predicted psychological explanation directly whereas mere ownership did not. Other studies suggest that affection increases favoritism and inclusion of a pet into the extended self (Sivadas and Venkatesh 1995) . Affection also may increase the likelihood of including a pet into an owner's social identity (for a human example of this social process, see Cross,
Morris, and Gore 2002).
Experiment 3 showed that the animal-human bond is intimately related to psychological explanation but provided no evidence that frequency of interaction has a significant impact on either affection for the fish or psychological explanation. In a previous study, Parise et al. (1999) found that dog owners were more likely than people who did not own a dog to cooperate financially with a computer-animated dog. The authors speculated this difference might have derived from the dog owners' experience with dogs. Our current study suggests that the real reason for these results might have rested more in dog owners' emotional investment in their dogs, in line with Caporeal and
Heyes ' (1997) argument that psychological explanation is a way of changing the values we place on animals.
Our study examined only one dimension of social relationships that may encourage psychological explanations of behavior. We speculate other social processes are involved as well. For example, a person's perceived compatibility or similarity to a pet or group of animals might lead to greater psychological explanations of its behavior (see Leyens et al. 1999) . Social processes could work in the other direction as well. For instance, some research suggests that people who are reminded of their mortality tend to respond by distancing themselves from animals and considering animals to be more different from humans than they do without such threats (Goldenberg 2001) . Social distance should discourage psychological explanation as well. 
